VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCES, by Hamilton Vreeland, Jr. Callaghan
and Co., Chicago, 1938. Pp. liv, 355. $6.00. by Stumberg, George Wilfred
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 2 | Number 1
November 1939
VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCES, by
Hamilton Vreeland, Jr. Callaghan and Co., Chicago,
1938. Pp. liv, 355. $6.00.
George Wilfred Stumberg
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
George Wilfred Stumberg, VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCES, by Hamilton Vreeland, Jr. Callaghan and Co., Chicago, 1938. Pp. liv,
355. $6.00., 2 La. L. Rev. (1939)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol2/iss1/31
BOOK REVIEWS
is any decency or principle in either group, and has left the
American advocates of totalitarian tyranny out on a limb.
With such rubbish Pound has no sympathy. He says: "A
psychological realism is abroad which regards reason as afford-
ing no more than a cover of illusion for processes judicial
and administrative which are fundamentally and necessarily
irrational."' He points out the impossibility of reconciling the
decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt,2 which held lawful a strike
for a closed shop, with the theory that Shaw and his associates
were simply the mouthpieces of the Federalist-Whig commercial
aristocracy from which they came and with which they associated.
It is difficult today to realize what a radical and unpopular de-
cision that was in the public opinion of 1842. The "realist" ex-
planation that Shaw was playing the demagogue is beneath
contempt. As Pound says: "It seems to be impossible for a
Marxian economic determinist to comprehend an honest man."8
The book closes with a tribute to those great doctrinal writ-
ers like Kent and Story, and to Pothier and other civil law jurists
from whom they derived much of their inspiration. The author
points out that the need for such writings is as great now as it
was then, but for a different reason. Then the courts had to decide
new questions without adequate materials; now a vast and chaotic
mass of materials requires painstaking search after principles for
which the courts have little time. Fortunately Wigmore, Williston,
Beale and others-to say nothing of the authors of the American
Law Institute Restatement-are the full equals of the great
writers of the era of which our author writes.
HENRY T. LuMmus*
VALiDrrY OF FOREIGN DIVORCES, by Hamilton Vreeland, Jr. Cal-
laghan and Co., Chicago, 1938. Pp. liv, 355. $6.00.
Professor Vreeland's monograph on the "Validity of Foreign
Divorces" consists of a comprehensive study of the Continental
and Anglo-American legal reactions to the matter of. the recogni-
tion which is to be given at the forum to a divorce decree ob-
tained in another state or country. The book is divided into six
parts, the first three of which are devoted successively to the
1. P. 27.
2. 45 Mass. 111 (1842).
3. P. 88.
* Associate Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Boston,
Mass.
19391
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
English decisions, to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States under the full faith and credit clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution and to the cases decided in each of the states
of the United States and of the District of Columbia. The fourth
part deals with the system of jurisdiction and recognition pro-
vided for by a Hague Convention of 1902, and by other treaties,
to none of which, of course, is the United States a party. The
fifth part is a summary of the "European Law aside from
Treaty." In the sixth part the author gives his own conclusions
as to the methods which might be employed in bringing about
greater uniformity in recognition.
The portions of the text which deal with English and Amer-
ican law should naturally be of greater practical interest to
American lawyers than those discussing continental reactions;
but the summaries of the law in different European countries do
serve as a partial basis for a comparative study. One wonders,
however, whether these summaries, as brief as Mr. Vreeland's
must be, adequately picture the points of view which exist in
the different continental countries. Whatever problems may be
involved in the recognition of foreign decrees by continental
courts, the social significance of the foreign divorce is not the
same in Europe as that involved in recognition by American
courts of divorce decrees entered in sister states. The migratory
divorce does not have the vogue there which it has with us,
largely because continentals do not migrate from one country to
another with the same facility as Americans have in moving from
one state to another. Furthermore, continental courts are prone
to take a strict view in recognizing foreign divorces of their own
nationals, sometimes refusing recognition under any circum-
stances; sometimes refusing recognition unless the grounds were
such as are regarded as valid at the forum.
Mr. Vreeland suggests that international and interstate uni-
formity could be brought about through resort to treaties in
which he would make domicil of both parties, or domicil of the
plaintiff plus service on the defendant or the last common domicil
of the parties, where there has been desertion, the basis for ju-
risdiction to grant a divorce entitled to full faith and credit.
Theoretically this might be done, but practically it seems impos-
sible. The failure to obtain widespread adoption of the Hague
Convention of 1902 indicates a reluctance on the part of the more
important nations to resort to treaty in a matter of this kind.
Furthermore, in the United States divorce as such is not regarded
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as involving national policy, to say nothing of international policy.
Resort to the treaty making power to cure (if one does exist on
a large scale) an internal evil arising out of our American system
of a union of states seems but a poor subterfuge to deal with a
matter which could, it is believed, be more adequately dealt with
through the available devices for internal control.
Under the Supreme Court decisions full faith and credit must
be given a foreign decree when it has been rendered in a state
which was at the time of its rendition the domicil of one of the
parties, provided service was had upon or appearance was made
by the other party. In addition, full faith and credit must be
given decrees granted in a state which was the domicil of both
parties or which was the matrimonial domicil. If the Supreme
Court were to hold that the foregoing rules also apply as re-
quirements for jurisdiction to grant a divorce for purposes of
due process, there would no longer be any problem as between
the states because then divorces granted ex parte at the domicil
of one of the spouses would be void there and everywhere else.
The Supreme Court could also bring about universal American
recognition of foreign state divorces by extending the present
rules of full faith and credit so as to include within the scope
of compulsory recognition divorces granted ex parte at the domicil
of one of the spouses. Most state courts now recognize such
divorces voluntarily and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws
in effect provides for full faith and credit to divorces granted at
the domicil of the party not at fault.
It is believed, however, that there is a tendency to exaggerate
the need for more stringent rules as to compulsory non-recogni-
tion or, on the other hand, as to more extensive required
recognition of sister state divorces. The courts of states where
the grounds for divorce are liberal, for the most part, recognize
the validity at the forum of divorces granted ex parte at the
domicil of one of the spouses. In states where the grounds are
limited, as in New York, the courts refuse full faith and credit
except where recognition must be given under the decisions of
the Supreme Court. But even in New York the position has been
taken that its rule of non-recognition does not apply where the
defendant was not a resident of New York at the time the decree
was granted and the divorce is one which is acceptable to the
courts of the matrimonial domicil. A widespread adoption of the
New York rule, by which the matter of validity at the forum of
a foreign divorce ex parte is referred to the matrimonial domicil,
1939]
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would mean that most divorces granted at a bona fide domicil
would be valid everywhere because, as already stated, most courts
have a liberal recognition policy. The exceptional situations
where a divorce although possibly valid where granted would
not be valid elsewhere would comprise those involving ex parte
divorces against non-resident defendants who at the time of the
decree were domiciled in a state which is also the matrimonial
domicil and which has a strict view as to recognition. Such
divorces would be invalid everywhere except, perhaps, where
granted.
The matter of recognition of foreign divorces involves a good
deal of local state policy which has behind it the local attitude
toward divorce. If the courts in states like New York were re-
quired to give full faith and credit to all divorces granted ex
parte, the local divorce policy could be evaded through a change
of domicil by one of the spouses. On the other hand no particular
harm can be done by permitting states having a liberal divorce
policy to recognize foreign divorces ex parte if they so desire.
When divorce is easily granted it makes but little difference
where it is granted.
The most deep rooted social evil in our interstate divorce
situation is believed to lie in the fact that in several states
divorces are habitually granted without either party being ac-
tually domiciled there. The defendant acquiesces in the suit for
for divorce, makes no defense on jurisdictional grounds, and both
parties assume that the judicial decree is a valid one, when in
fact, aside from the possible inability of either the plaintiff or
the defendant to question it because of estoppel, it is void because
none of the recognized jurisdictional standards have been com-
plied with. The only way in which the evils of the divorce which
is void because of lack of any basis for jurisdiction can be cor-
rected is by bringing home to the spouses the fact that the decree
may at some time or other lead to complications at the instance
of some person not a party to the divorce proceedings. The
problem here is not a legal but an educational one.
GEORGE WILFRED STUMBERG*
* Professor of Law, University of Texas.
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